Showing 1 - 10 of 2,756
Using data from an experiment by Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993), designed for a different purpose, we test the "standard theory" that players have preferences only over their own mentary payoffs and that play will be in (evolutionary stable) equilibrium. In the experiment each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011284229
probability before the election (Maskin and Tirole's "feedback" case). In the three-period case, with two elections, the dynamic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011286492
In this paper we analyze the consequences of the fairness recommendation of the Venice Commission in allocating voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010197548
voting behavior and how this is affected by host countries. Using unique micro-data on Chilean expatriates living in Europe … exploit local transitory shocks to the cost of voting given by the rainfall on the day of the election. We find that migrants …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012650135
liberal-conservative spectrum are controlled for in the analysis of voting behavior, trade barrier preferences lose their … affect voting behavior through channels involving identity-driven factors that are different from the channels through which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012602182
The role of electoral incentives vs. selection is ideally analyzed in a setting where the same legislators are selected to decide on policies under different electoral rules and where voter preferences on policies can be precisely measured. This is the first paper to look at such a situation....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012286323
studies strategic voting when voters have pure common values but may be ambiguity averse -- exhibit Ellsberg-type behavior …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671890
, but the magnitude of this effect was small and statistically insignificant. In fact, non-voting appears particularly high …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011862577
Who will vote quadratically in large-N elections under quadratic voting (QV)? First, who will vote? Although the core … examine reasons that, in large-N elections, the number of votes that an individual casts may deviate substantially from that …, voting behavior and outcomes would be determined predominately by social and psychological forces, would thereby exhibit few …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011578439
Prominent theory research on voting uses models in which expected pivotality drives voters' turnout decisions and hence … determines voting outcomes. It is recognized, however, that such work is at odds with Downs's paradox: in practice, many …. Accordingly, we examine a complementary model of large-N elections at the opposite end of the spectrum, where pivotality effects …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012200354