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In this paper the concepts of manipulation as strategic voting (misrepresentation of true preferences) and strategic …
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We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting … compare the possibilities for manipulation across different quotas. It turns out that the simple majority quota maximizes the … surprisingly, simple majority voting is not necessarily the optimal choice of a society that is concerned about agenda manipulation. …
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We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i's prediction value equals the difference between the conditional...
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