Similar Search Results

How elections matter : theory and evidence from environmental policy

List, John A.; Sturm, Daniel - 2006

largely determined by lobbying, we find strong effects of electoral incentives. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010439364

Citizens or lobbies : who controls policy?

Roberti, Paolo - 2016

This paper analyses a model of electoral competition with lobbying, where candidates hold private information about … increase the effect of lobbying. If, however, the cost of running for office is sufficiently large, there is no effect of … lobbying on policy. The model thus demonstrates that uncertainty on the influence of special interests can lead to large …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703380

Vote buying in the US Congress

Matter, Ulrich; Roberti, Paolo; Slotwinski, Michaela - 2019

We assess the influence of moneyed interests on legislative decisions. Our theory predicts that the vote outcome distribution and donation flows in a legislature feature a discontinuity at the approval threshold of bills if special interest groups are involved in vote buying. Testing the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012103631

Vote buying in the US Congress

Matter, Ulrich; Roberti, Paolo; Slotwinski, Michaela - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012126192

Lobbying in a multidimensional policy space with salient issues

Roberti, Paolo - 2014

We present a citizen-candidate model on a multidimensional policy space with lobbying, where citizens regard some … offset the effect of lobbying on the implemented policy. This result is in sharp contrast with previous work on … unidimensional citizen-candidate models that predict the irrelevance of lobbying on the implemented policy. In an extension of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011729170

Electoral control when policies are for sale

Farvaque, Étienne; Lagadec, Gael - 2009

This article analyses the dynamics of electoral promises, building on an electoral competition model with endogenous policies. It extends the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model [Grossman G., Helpman E. [1994], "Protection for sale", American Economic Review, 84, 4, 833-850] to include sanctions from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003806719

How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy

Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2012

small spending by special interests. -- lobbying ; voting ; special interests ; credibility …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009532679

Lobbying of firms by voters

Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2009

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378822

On the size of the winning set in the presence of interest groups

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 2005

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343278

Electoral competition with policy compromise

Grossman, Gene M.; Helpman, Elhanan - 1996

We study the electoral competition between two parties vying for seats in a legislature. The electorate includes knowledgeable voters and impressionable voters, the latter susceptible to electioneering activities. A special interest group provides campaign financing in exchange for influence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009697458

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