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The Trust Indenture Act prohibits a binding vote of bondholders to change any core term-principal amount, interest rate, or maturity date-of a bond issue. In this Article, I show how the prohibition on a collective action clause inhibits a troubled company's ability to reorganize outside of...
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We explore Time-Phased Voting (“TPV”), an arrangement in which long-term shareholders receive more votes per share than short-term shareholders. TPV has gained prominence in recent years as a proposed remedy for perceived corporate myopia. We begin with theory, situating TPV relative to...
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Despite the ever-growing influence of shareholders in corporate governance, interested voting is a topic that has not been fully explored. While the law is attentive to transactions with a controlling shareholder, such transactions hardly cover all instances in which an interested shareholder...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013310724
Many believe that deliberative democracy, where individuals discuss alternatives before voting on them, should result in collectively superior outcomes because voters become better informed and decisions are justified using reason. These deliberations typically involve a moderator, however,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524094
The quality of proxy advisors' voting recommendations is important for policymakers and industry participants. We analyze the design of recommendations (available to all market participants) and research reports (available only to subscribers) by a proxy advisor, whose objective is to maximize...
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We develop a game theoretic model in which shareholders maximize the value of their portfolio and can buy or sell shares. Liquidity generates a shareholder dilemma: Voting for the policy that seems optimal for the firm maximizes portfolio value only when pivotal; in all other instances it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012847967
Traditionally, fund managers cast votes on behalf of investors whose capital they manage. Recently, this system has come under intense debate given the growing concentration of voting power among a few asset managers and disagreements over environmental and social issues. Major fund managers now...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014355573