Showing 1 - 10 of 1,392
This chapter surveys the literature on strategy proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025183
values. The SSPI can serve as a control for power imbedded in voting blocs, permitting fuller analysis of other factors that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009789971
benefit a lot from having a ticket, suggesting instrumental voting. In each referendum, a majority votes in line with self …-interest, providing strong evidence for pocketbook voting. However, social preferences like altruism, public good considerations and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010496966
We develop and test a theory of voting and turnout decisions that integrates self-interest, social preferences, and … pocketbook benefits do not explain voting, then voting is expressive. If the perceived probability of being pivotal is non … strongly influence participation and voting. However, social or expressive motives, such as stated altruism, environmental …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011645032
We develop and test a theory of voting and turnout decisions that integrates self-interest, social preferences, and … pocketbook benefits do not explain voting, then voting is expressive. If the perceived probability of being pivotal is non … strongly influence participation and voting. However, social or expressive motives, such as stated altruism, environmental …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011657009
The average voting procedure reflects the weighted average of expressed opinions in [0,1]. Participants typically … taste is central enough, the range of possible values for the average voting outcome is narrower than the corresponding … range for majority voting. For instance, if the average taste is at 1/2, the limit equilibrium outcome is this value plus or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009505651
Voting rules can be assessed from quite different perspectives: the axiomatic, the pragmatic, in terms of computational … learning perspective and ask how 'well' a few prominent voting rules can be learned by a neural network. To address this … training sample size for a neural network varies significantly with the voting rule, and we rank a number of popular voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012317249
A conclave is a voting mechanism in which a committee selects an alternative by voting until a sufficient supermajority … conclave leads to efficiency gains relative to simple majority voting. We also compare welfare properties of a static versus a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011336977
We study communication in committees selecting one of two alternatives when consensus is required and agents have private information about their preferences. Delaying the decision is costly, so a form of multiplayer war of attrition emerges. Waiting allows voters to express the intensity of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011872697
We study experimentally the effectiveness of communication in common value committees exhibiting publicly known heterogeneous biases. We test models assuming respectively self-interested and strategic-, joint payoff-maximizing- and cognitively heterogeneous agents. These predict varying degrees...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444227