Showing 1 - 10 of 337
We prove a general possibility result for collective decision problems where individual allocations are one-dimensional, preferences are single-peaked (strictly convex), and feasible allocation profiles cover a closed convex set. Special cases include the celebrated median voter theorem (Black...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704962
When a group of voters selects a committee out of a set of candidates, it is common and often desirable to endow these voters with some veto power. I present impossibility results showing that even limited veto power makes many mechanisms of interest manipulable. This applies in particular (i)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014126012
This chapter surveys voting game experiments that involve incomplete information with regard to voters’ opinions about what the best course of action might be and characteristics, especially their private costs and benefits related to decision making and their group affiliations (i.e., which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014110217
A group of N individuals must choose between two collective alternatives. Under Quadratic Voting (QV), agents buy votes in favor of their preferred alternative from a clearing house, paying the square of the number of votes purchased; the sum of all votes purchased determines the outcome. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014142715
This paper considers the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible resource among agents. We are interested in rules eliminating the possibility that an agent can compensate another to misrepresent her preferences, making both agents strictly better off. Such rules are said to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012968671
This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing preferences on a finite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous, and strategy-proof on a maximal single-crossing domain if and only if it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012949960
Approval voting allows voters to support as many candidates as they wish. One advantage of the method is that voters have weak or no incentives to vote insincerely. However, the exact meaning of this statement depends on how the voters' preferences over candidates are extended to sets. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012909606
This paper experimentally analyzes the effects if signatories to an international environmental agreement (IEA) apply different voting schemes to determine the terms of the agreement. To this end, unanimity, qualified majority voting, and simple majority voting are compared with respect to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008660455
We investigate whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in a large election with three alternatives. The environment is the same as in the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet (1785)). Voters have common preferences that depend on the unknown state of nature, and they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009127595
In modern elections, ideologically motivated candidates with a wealth of information about individual voters and sophisticated campaign strategies are faced by voters who lack awareness of some political issues and are uncertain about the exact political positions of candidates. We study to what...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010255046