We consider strategic voting with incomplete information and partially common values in sequential committees. A proposal is considered against the status quo in one committee, and only upon its approval advances for consideration in a second committee. Committee members (i) are privately and...

There often exists a supermajority rule that enables the minority party to delay or prevent a vote on a bill. I construct a two-period model consisting of a representative voter, self-interested parties, and a media outlet. In the model, the majority party has an incentive to misrepresent the...

We use the citizen-candidate model to study electoral outcomes under the Alternative Vote rule, a voting method often proposed as a replacement to the prevalent Plurality rule. We show that, like the Plurality rule, the Alternative Vote rule deters multiple candidate clusters and the presence of...

We explore whether retrospective voting is related to voters’ democratic experience. To this end, we compare the voting behavior in West Germany to the voting behavior in the formerly non-democratic East Germany after a disaster relief program addressing a flood in 2013. Our analysis reveals a...

I develop models in which a minimum winning coalition decides on the level of government spending, where the Coase theorem holds amongst members of the winning coalition. An increase in the supermajority requirement has potentially conflicting effects on spending. A higher requirement increases...

Inclusive voting rules are rules that require the approval of a greater set of policy makers than a simple majority. Using a dynamic voting model with stochastic shocks, we identify a novel distortive effect of inclusive voting rules. Under inclusive voting rules, the identity of the pivotal...

We analyze the ECB Governing Council's voting procedures. The literature has by now discussed numerous aspects of the rotation model but does not account for many institutional aspects of the voting procedure of the GC. Using the randomization scheme based on the multilinear extension (MLE) of...

We analyze the ECB Governing Council’s voting procedures. The literature has by now discussed numerous aspects of the rotation model but does not account for many institutional aspects of the voting procedure of the GC. Using the randomization scheme based on the multilinear extension (MLE) of...

In this note, we use the technique of option sets to sort out the implications of coalitional strategyproofness in the spatial setting. We also discuss related issues and open problems. -- social choice ; strategyproofness ; voting