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Which voting rule is most likely to choose the “best” candidate?

Tideman, T. Nicolaus; Plassmann, Florenz - In: Public choice 158 (2013) 3/4, pp. 331-357

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010374591

Efficient collective decision-making, marginal cost pricing, and quadratic voting

Tideman, T. Nicolaus; Plassmann, Florenz - In: Public choice 172 (2017) 1/2, pp. 45-73

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011777862

Which Voting Rule is Most Likely to Choose the 'Best' Candidate?

Tideman, T. Nicolaus; Plassmann, Florenz - 2012

One criterion for evaluating voting rules is the frequency with which they select the best candidate. Using a spatial model of voting that is capable of simulating data with the same statistical structure as data from actual elections, we simulate elections for which we can define the best...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014176908

How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?

Plassmann, Florenz; Tidemann, T. Nicolaus - In: Social choice and welfare 42 (2014) 1, pp. 31-75

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010235931

Further support for ranking candidates in elections

Gehrlein, William V.; Lepelley, Dominique; Plassmann, … - In: Group decision and negotiation 25 (2016) 5, pp. 941-966

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549336

A comparison of theoretical and empirical evaluations of the Borda Compromise

Gehrlein, William V.; Plassmann, Florenz - In: Social choice and welfare 43 (2014) 3, pp. 747-772

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010412316

Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election?

Gehrlein, William V.; Lepelley, Dominique; Plassmann, … - In: Social choice and welfare 46 (2016) 4, pp. 707-747

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011452565

Collective decisions and voting : the potential for public choice

Tideman, Nicolaus; Tideman, T. Nicolaus - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003344572

Interacting double monotonicity failure with direction of impact under five voting methods

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Tideman, T. Nicolaus - In: Mathematical social sciences 67 (2014), pp. 57-66

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010461276

Weak Condorcet winner(s) revisited

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Tideman, T. Nicolaus - In: Public choice 160 (2014) 3/4, pp. 313-326

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010388671