We analyse the stability of countries within a monetary union in the face of asymmetric shocks, using a simple but widely applicable model. We show that members of the union may be subject to severe cycles following asymmetric shocks if there is a significant backward looking element in...

This paper investigates the importance of fiscal policy in providing macroeconomic stabilisation in a monetary union. We use a microfounded New Keynesian model of a monetary union which incorporates persistence in inflation, and examine non-cooperative interactions of fiscal and monetary...

The combination of discretionary monetary policy, labor-market distortions and nominal wage rigidity yields an inflation bias as monetary policy tries to exploit nominal wage contracts to address labour-market distortions Although an inflation target eliminates this inflation bias, it creates a...

This paper investigates the macroeconomic implications of different regimes of international fiscal coordination and monetary-fiscal cooperation in a monetary union with independent fiscal authorities that act strategically vis a vis a common central bank. In the presence of other policy goals...

Sufficiently flexible labour markets are considered an important precondition for countries to benefit from membership in the monetary union. Economic policy coordination within the European Community is extensive and includes issues related to labour market structures. In this paper we study...

Policy mix problems may arise in a monetary union with centralized monetary policy and decentralized fiscal policy. A consequence of this may be an inappropriate stabilization of shocks. This paper addresses how policy coordination problems are affected by the objectives of the monetary...

This study operationalizes the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) to investigate the preparedness of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) members to form a Monetary Union (MU). Inflation and output models are estimated, with the sample 1988:01 to 2017:12 for the former and 1967 to 2016...

This paper explicitly models strategic interaction between two independent national fiscal authorities and a single central bank in a simple New Keynesian model of a monetary union. Monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Coordination of fiscal policies...

This paper explicitly models strategic interaction between two independent national fiscal authorities and a single central bank in a simple New Keynesian model of a monetary union. Monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Coordination of fiscal policies...

This paper explicitly models strategic interaction between two independent national fiscal authorities and a single central bank in a simple New Keynesian model of a monetary union. Monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Coordination of fiscal policies...