This paper is a contribution to the literature on rational design of trade agreements. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an incomplete contract among sovereign states. Incomplete contracts contain gaps. Ex post, contractual gaps may leave gains from trade unrealized; they may create...

This paper constitutes an attempt to reframe and eventually deflate the ongoing “compliance-vs.-rebalancing” debate which has permeated WTO scholarship for the last 10 years. Our main criticism concerns the substance of the entire debate. We find that scholars on both sides of the...

The WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) has been hailed as a fundamental aspect of the Multilateral Trading System for developing countries. At the same time developing countries face many challenges to ensure their effective participation in the mechanism. This paper presents statistical...

The WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) has been hailed as a fundamental aspect of the Multilateral Trading System for developing countries. At the same time developing countries face many challenges to ensure their effective participation in the mechanism. This paper presents statistical...

WTO arbitrators rely on economics to establish the permissible retaliation limits authorized by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) which arguably serves to enforce the overall agreement. We examine how theoretical and quantitative economic analysis has and can be used in this stage of...

In May 2012, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) issued a report on the labeling of tuna in a dispute between the United States and Mexico, known as the US — Tuna II (Mexico) case. The case has attracted a fair amount of attention, but not on the fact that it raised, at an...

In international relations, short-run incentives for non-cooperation often dominate. Yet, (external) institutions for enforcing cooperation are hampered by national sovereignty, supposedly strengthening the role of selfenforcing mechanisms. This paper examines their scope with a focus on...

In international relations, short-run incentives for non-cooperation often dominate. Yet, (external) institutions for enforcing cooperation are hampered by national sovereignty, supposedly strengthening the role of selfenforcing mechanisms. This paper examines their scope with a focus on...

On 1 January 1995, the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) entered into force. Until August 2006, the DSU has since been applied to 348 complaints - more cases than dispute settlement under the GATT 1947 had dealt with in nearly five decades. The...