Showing 1 - 10 of 3,434
In the paper we test a homogenous agent version of the Montgomery's (1991) non-cooperative wage posting model. The inclusion of intrinsic costs, related to the uncertainty when changing the alternative agents are already using, alters the outcome of the model in two respects: firstly, it...
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We introduce coordination failures driven by beliefs regarding the presence of taste discriminators as a channel of discrimination in productive activities requiring the input of multiple agents. We show that discrimination can persist under perfectly observable ability, when taste for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011967389
We model the interaction between an employer and a worker with interdependent preferences in a simple one-shot production process. In particular, we assume that the worker becomes kinder if she senses that her employer is an altruist. We assume that intentions are private information. Thus, the...
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This study extends a bilateral gift exchange experiment by Clark et al. (2010) who investigate how feedback of information about wages paid in the market affects both employers’ wage setting and workers’ performance. We provide either quantitative or qualitative information on the average...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822194
The traditional literature treat wage dispersion and firm dynamics, which are closely connected to each other, in isolation. This paper delivers a unified treatment to wage dispersion and firm-size distribution by developing a real-option-theoretic approach. The model is tractable with analytic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012844814
One-shot interaction and repeated interaction often co-exist in the real world. We study possible behavioral effects of this co-existence in a principal-agent setting, in which a principal simultaneously employs a permanent and a temporary agent. Our experimental results indicate that there is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944228
We experimentally test whether intentional and observable discriminatory pay of symmetric agents in the Winter (2004) game causes low paid agents to reduce effort. We control for intentionality of wages by either allowing a principal to determine wages or by implementing a random process. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003924261