When workers have incomplete information about their ability, they can learn about this ability by searching for jobs, both while employed and unemployed. Search outcomes yield information for updating the belief about the ability which affects optimal search decisions in the future. Firms...

I construct a theoretical framework in which firms offer wage-tenure contracts to direct the search by risk-averse workers. All workers can search, on or off the job. I characterize an equilibrium and prove its existence. The equilibrium generates a non-degenerate, continuous distribution of...

We examine the labor market effects of incomplete information about the workers' own job-finding process. Search outcomes convey valuable information, and learning from search generates endogenous heterogeneity in workers' beliefs about their job-finding probability. We characterize this process...

We construct an equilibrium theory of learning from search in the labor market, which addresses the search behavior of workers, the creation of jobs, and the wage distribution as functions of unemployment duration. In the model, each worker has incomplete information about his job-finding...

This paper contributes to the search theory of unemployment by endogenously generating matching functions for skilled and unskilled workers from a wage-posting game. The model is capable of producing a positive skill premium and a positive wage differential among homogenous unskilled workers....

The authors analyze markets where each of n buyers wants to buy one unit and each of m sellers wants to sell one or more units of an indivisible good. Sellers first set prices, then buyers choose which sellers to visit. There are equilibria where each buyer visits sellers at random and faces a...