In diesem Aufsatz untersuchen wir das Wachstum der Vorstandsvergütung in den vergangenen 15 Jahren und stellen uns die Frage, wie sich die Vorstandsvergütung in der Zukunft entwickeln könnte. Wir vermuten, dass die Einführung von Long-Term-Incentives (LTI) in Form von Aktienoptionsplänen,...

Despite its potential role, CEO quality has been inadequately addressed in CEO compensation research. Using an Australian sample of 571 firms, this paper provides evidence that CEO quality, measured by CEO reputation and tenure, has a positive effect on firm performance, and explains...

We examine the effect of say on pay regulation in the United Kingdom (UK). Consistent with the view that shareholders regard say on pay as a value-creating mechanism, the regulation's announcement triggered a positive stock price reaction at firms with weak penalties for poor performance. UK...

We document that firms whose compensation peers experience weak say on pay votes reduce CEO compensation following those votes. Reductions reflect proxy adviser concerns about peers' compensation contracts and are stronger when CEOs receive excess compensation, when they compete more closely...

In the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, flawed variable pay structures of executives were blamed by many for contributing to the build-up of the global financial turmoil, as they allegedly incentivized them to engage in excessive risk-taking. Legislators around the globe decided to...

We analyze how the reputational concerns of boards influence executive compensation and the use of hidden pay. Independent boards reduce disclosed pay to signal their independence, but are more likely to use inefficient hidden pay than manager-friendly boards. Stronger reputational pressures...

CEOs of public (listed) firms earn more than their counterparts in similar private (unlisted) firms. This can either be because rent extraction is easier in public firms than in private firms, or because managing a public firm involves more legal and institutional responsibilities than managing...

CEOs of S&P 500 firms that report high non-GAAP earnings relative to GAAP earnings receive more than $600 thousand in unexplained pay. The abnormally high pay appears even after controlling for the level of non-GAAP earnings and despite relatively weak GAAP performance and low returns....

The large compensation received by bank executives is among the many factors blamed for the risk-taking that led to the 2008-2009 financial crisis. We test whether and how pay disparities between CEO and non-CEO executives—the so-called CEO pay gap—influenced risk taking at publicly traded...