We investigate how workers' performance is affected by the timing of wages in a real-effort experiment. In all treatments agents earn the same wage sum but wage increases are distributed differently over time. We find that agents work harder under increasing wage profiles if they do not know...

We study the role of employees' identification to the employer for wage growth. We first show in a formal model that identification implies countervailing effects: Employees with higher identification are more valuable as they exert higher efforts, but have weaker bargaining positions, and less...

The impact of wage increases on job satisfaction are explored. First, it is empirically established that current job satisfaction rises with absolute wage level as well as with wage increases. Second, a basic job satisfaction function is constructed based on the empirical results, and...

The impact of wage increases on job satisfaction are explored. First, it is empirically established that current job satisfaction rises with absolute wage level as well as with wage increases. Second, a basic job satisfaction function is constructed based on the empirical results, and...

We investigate wage differences between newly hired and incumbent employees. We show in a formal model that when employees care for wages as well as match-specific utility, incumbents earn less than new recruits if and only if firm-specific human capital is not too important. The existence and...