This brief, written for the "Unrigging the Labor Market" convening on June 13, 2018 at Harvard Law School, summarizes the empirical research on the relationship between covenants not to compete, their enforceability, and wages

This study examines the effect of noncompete enforceability on training and wages. An increase from non-enforcement to mean enforceability is associated with a 14% increase in training, which tends to be firm-sponsored and designed to upgrade or teach new skills. In contrast to theoretical...

We examine the use of noncompete agreements (NCAs) and their relationship with wage bargaining and wage outcomes using new data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997. NCAs cover 18% of the workers in our sample and adoption patterns are broadly consistent with prior research. The...

I study the relationship between firm growth and the characteristics of newly hired workers. Using Census microdata I obtain a novel empirical result: when a given firm grows faster it hires workers with higher past wages. These results suggest that productive, fast-growing firms tend to hire...

This paper investigates how takeovers create value. Using plant-level data, I show that acquirers increase targets’ productivity through more efficient use of capital and labor. Acquirers significantly reduce capital expenditures, wages, and employment in target plants, though output is...

This paper tests whether the correlation between wages and the spatial concentration of employment can be explained by unobserved worker productivity differences. Residential location is used as a proxy for a worker’s unobserved productivity, and average workplace commute time is used to test...