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Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections
McMurray, Joseph - In: Games and economic behavior 133 (2022), pp. 150-161
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013337779
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Indonesian politics in 2014 : democracy’s close call
Aspinall, Edward; Mietzner, Marcus - In: Bulletin of Indonesian economic studies 50 (2014) 3, pp. 347-369
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487689
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Costs of change, political polarization, and re-election hurdles
Gersbach, Hans; Muller, Philippe; Tejada, Oriol - 2015 - This version: August 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409981
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Does charisma discourage experience and encourage extremism? : the electoral strategies of a populist candidate
Serra, Gilles - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011664914
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Comparative politics and quasi-rational markets
McMenamin, Iain; Breen, Michael; Muñoz-Portillo, Juan - In: New political economy 21 (2016) 6, pp. 587-605
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011666995
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The puzzling practice of paying "cash for votes"
Murugesan, Anand; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2023
exchange for their votes. That practice undermines the functioning of democracy but is pervasive in many parts of the world …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014295086
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Democracy, demography & diaspora : electoral legitimacy, key to Croatia's future
McClellan, Dorothy S.; Knez, Nikola - In: International journal of social sciences : IJoSS 12 (2023) 1, pp. 11-49
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014519832
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Electoral turnovers
Marx, Benjamin M.; Pons, Vincent; Rollet, Vincent - 2022
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012819454
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Electoral competition with costly policy changes : a dynamic perspective
Gersbach, Hans; Jackson, Matthew O.; Muller, Philippe; … - 2020
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012229121
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Reelection threshold contracts in politics
Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - 2001
When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408440