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Information Aggregation in Poisson-Elections

Ekmekci, Mehmet - 2019

The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, then elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any responsive and symmetric equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012896425

Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals

Martin, Mathieu; Nganmeni, Zéphirin; Tovey, Craig A. - In: Social choice and welfare 57 (2021) 1, pp. 181-195

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012616176

Information aggregation in Poisson-elections

Ekmekci, Mehmet; Lauermann, Stephan - 2021

The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We find that the modern...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012499713

Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies

Brink, René van den; Dimitrov, Dinko; Rusinowska, Agnieszka - In: Social choice and welfare 56 (2021) 3, pp. 509-530

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500090

Excluded coalitions and the 2013 German federal election

Hiller, Tobias - In: Applied economics letters 25 (2018) 13, pp. 936-940

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012131132

Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After

Holler, Manfred J. - 2013

Power -- Voting -- The Measurement of Power -- Applications of Voting Power Measures -- Voting Power in the European …The developments over a thirty-year time span in the study of power, especially voting power, are traced in this book … themes discussed in the well-known 1982 publication "Power, Voting and Voting Power" (edited by Manfred J. Holler). Thirty …