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Az ellenzék ereje : általános súlyozott szavazási játékok
Kóczy, László Á.; Pintér, Péter Miklós - 2010
players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion … or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted voting games, where the value of a coalition is a random variable. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008668694
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Electing the Pope
Kóczy, László Á.; Sziklai, Balázs - 2013
Few elections attract so much attention as the Papal Conclave that elects the religious leader of over a billion Catholics worldwide. The Conclave is an interesting case of qualified majority voting with many participants and no formal voting blocks. Each cardinal is a wellknown public gure with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009741317
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Focused power : experiments, the Shapley-Shubik power index, and focal points
Geller, Chris R.; Mustard, Jamie; Shahwan, Ranya - 2013
Experiments evaluate the fit of human behaviour to the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI), a formula of voter power. Groups of six subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms. Earnings proxy for measured power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009789971
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The Shapley-Shubik index for simple games with multiple alternatives
Bilbao, Jesús Mario; Fernández, J. R.; Ĺópez, J. J. - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003667415
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Excluded coalitions and the distribution of power in parliaments
Hiller, Tobias - In: Applied economics 48 (2016) 4/6, pp. 321-330
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412809
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The prediction value
Koster, Maurice; Kurz, Sascha; Lindner, Ines; Napel, Stefan - 2013
We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i's prediction value equals the difference between the conditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010225788
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A note on apportionment methods
Shellshear, Evan (contributor) - 2007
This paper investigates the suitability of apportionment methods based on the idea of preserving the coalition function …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003730883
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Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies
Brink, René van den; Dimitrov, Dinko; Rusinowska, Agnieszka - 2019
is at least one winning coalition. Such a game is said to be precisely supportive if it is possible to assign weights to … players in such a way that a coalition being winning in a partition implies that the combined weight of its members is maximal … coalition. We show that decisive plurality games with at most four players, majority games with an arbitrary number of players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012057177
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Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies
van den Brink, Rene; Dimitrov, Dinko; Rusinowska, Agnieszka - 2019
is at least one winning coalition. Such a game is said to be precisely supportive if it is possible to assign weights to … players in such a way that a coalition being winning in a partition implies that the combined weight of its members is maximal … coalition. We show that decisive plurality games with at most four players, majority games with an arbitrary number of players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014104553
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Az ellenzék ereje: Általános súlyozott szavazási játékok
Kóczy, László Á.; Pintér, Péter Miklós - 2010
players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion … or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted voting games, where the value of a coalition is a random variable. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494447