Showing 1 - 10 of 2,004
largely determined by lobbying, we find strong effects of electoral incentives. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010439364
This paper analyses a model of electoral competition with lobbying, where candidates hold private information about … increase the effect of lobbying. If, however, the cost of running for office is sufficiently large, there is no effect of … lobbying on policy. The model thus demonstrates that uncertainty on the influence of special interests can lead to large …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703380
We assess the influence of moneyed interests on legislative decisions. Our theory predicts that the vote outcome distribution and donation flows in a legislature feature a discontinuity at the approval threshold of bills if special interest groups are involved in vote buying. Testing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012103631
We assess the influence of moneyed interests on legislative decisions. Our theory predicts that the vote outcome distribution and donation flows in a legislature feature a discontinuity at the approval threshold of bills if special interest groups are involved in vote buying. Testing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012126192
We present a citizen-candidate model on a multidimensional policy space with lobbying, where citizens regard some … offset the effect of lobbying on the implemented policy. This result is in sharp contrast with previous work on … unidimensional citizen-candidate models that predict the irrelevance of lobbying on the implemented policy. In an extension of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011729170
This paper studies how income tax rates are determined and how they are related to government corruption in the form of fund capture. A model is presented where rich voters can block redistribution by buying the votes of some poor voters. In equilibrium there is only limited redistribution and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294765
A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325896
This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. The firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representative support the policy. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281930
This article analyses the dynamics of electoral promises, building on an electoral competition model with endogenous policies. It extends the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model [Grossman G., Helpman E. [1994], "Protection for sale", American Economic Review, 84, 4, 833-850] to include sanctions from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003806719
small spending by special interests. -- lobbying ; voting ; special interests ; credibility …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009532679