Ideally, a representative democracy awards a genuine vote to each adult. We study whether this applies in competitive democracies with an election model combining district appor- tionment and proportional representation (PR). Four classic seat allocation rules, including d'Hondt (1882), are...

We extend approval voting so as to elect multiple candidates, who may be either individuals or members of a political party, in rough proportion to their approval in the electorate. We analyze two divisor methods of apportionment, first proposed by Jefferson and Webster, that iteratively...

This paper shows that union members are consistently more supportive of redistribution than other citizens. This is partly because union members are drawn predominantly from socio-economic strata characterized by relatively low incomes and relatively high exposure to labor-market risks, but it...

We study voting over higher education finance in an economy with risk averse households who are heterogeneous in income. We compare four different systems and analyse voters' choices among them: a traditional subsidy scheme, a pure loan scheme, income contingent loans and graduate taxes. Using...

We study voting over higher education finance in an economy with two regions and two separated labor markets. Households differ in their financial endowment and their children's ability. Non-students are immobile. Students decide where to study; they return home after graduation with exogenous...

We study voting over higher education finance in an economy with risk averse households who are heterogeneous in income. We compare four different systems and analyse voters' choices among them: a traditional subsidy scheme, a pure loan scheme, income contingent loans and graduate taxes. Using...

We study voting over higher education finance in an economy with two regions and two separated labor markets. Households differ in their financial endowment and their children's ability. Non-students are immobile. Students decide where to study; they return home after graduation with exogenous...

We study voting over higher education finance in an economy with two regions and two separated labor markets. Households dffer in their financial endowment and their children's ability. Non-students are immobile. Students decide where to study; they return home after graduation with exogenous...

We study voting over higher education finance in an economy with risk averse households who are heterogeneous in income. We compare four different systems and analyse voters' choices among them: A traditional subsidy scheme, a pure loan scheme, income contingent loans and graduate taxes. Using...

Incumbent politicians may worry about their chances of re-election. Re-election concerns may induce incumbents to write contracts that have low power incentives (LPI) instead of high power incentives (HPI). This may result in inefficient outcomes in cases where high power incentives are...