We investigate asset manager characteristics that influence ESG voting patterns using a decade of voting data with more than 20 million observations. Asset managers predominantly vote against social and environmental proposals. Especially, large and passive asset managers vote the least in favor...

Using a sample of voting turnouts of annual general meetings of European companies, we document that shareholder voting turnouts are significantly different according to the ownership structure of the company. Different types of shareholder classes show different voting engagements according to...

Empirical evidence suggests that the voting premium in the Korean securities market is strongly related to the structure of corporate ownership. We find that the premium attached to voting stock is positively and significantly associated with the control value of a block of shares held by...

We explore Time-Phased Voting (“TPV”), an arrangement in which long-term shareholders receive more votes per share than short-term shareholders. TPV has gained prominence in recent years as a proposed remedy for perceived corporate myopia. We begin with theory, situating TPV relative to...

Over the past several years, corporate law scholarship has carefully analyzed the effects of dual-class capital structures, which allocate superior voting rights to insiders and inferior voting rights to public shareholders. This Article adds to the literature by focusing on a unique and novel...

We analyze the determinants of a firm's ownership structure when decisions over risk are taken by majority vote of risk-averse shareholders. We show that when a fraction of small, diversified shareholders abstains from voting, mid-sized blockholders may emerge to mitigate the conflict of...

We document that in M&As a significant proportion of targets' equity is owned by financial institutions that simultaneously own targets' bonds (“dual holders”). Targets with larger equity ownership by dual holders have lower M&A equity premia and larger abnormal bond returns, particularly...

We test the hypothesis whether a specific aspect of culture - trust in others - affects shareholder voting behavior by substituting for costly monitoring. We find consistent evidence that the percentage of votes cast at shareholder meetings is lower in high-trust countries while the percentage...

We test the hypothesis that a specific aspect of culture - trust in others - affects shareholder voting behavior as it lowers investors' concerns of being expropriated. We find consistent evidence that the percentage of votes cast at shareholder meetings is lower in high-trust countries while...