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Numerous theoretical studies have shown that information aggregation through voting is fragile. We consider a model of information aggregation with vote-contingent payoffs and generically characterize voting behavior in large committees. We use this characterization to identify the set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012866804
We investigate experimentally the effects of corrupt experts on information aggregation in committees. We find that non-experts … are significantly less likely to delegate through abstention when there is a probability that experts are corrupt. Such … decreased abstention when the probability of corrupt experts is low, actually increases information efficiency in committee …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047178
Numerous theoretical studies have shown that information aggregation through voting is fragile. We consider a model of information aggregation with vote-contingent payoffs and generically characterize voting behavior in large committees. We use this characterization to identify the set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012029166
In this paper, I analyze how voters optimally aggregate and use the information provided by informed experts. I fi nd … relationship between the share of experts endorsing an alternative and the share of citizens voting for it is non-monotonic. The … explanation is that consensus among experts can be reached either because all experts share the same information or because …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012828762
When groups face difficult problems, the voice of experts may be lost in the noise of others' contributions. We present … such a degree that it is in fact optimal for all non-experts to contribute their bits of information. A single individual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012257743
When groups face difficult problems, the voices of experts may be lost in the noise of others' contributions. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432144
We examine whether and how democratic procedures can achieve socially desirable public good provision in the presence of profound uncertainty about the benefits of public goods, i.e., when citizens are able to identify the distribution of benefits only if they aggregate their private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012994342
The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We find that the modern...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806603
We study the effect of public information on collective decision-making in committees, where members can have both common and conflicting interests. In the presence of public information, the simple and efficient vote-your-signal strategy profile no longer constitutes an equilibrium under the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011729095
This paper studies the effects that the revelation of information on the electorate's preferences has on voters' turnout decisions. The experimental data show that closeness in the division of preferences induces a significant increase in turnout. Moreover, for closely divided electorates (and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058888