Over the course of their professional lives, Henry E. Kyburg, Isaac Levi, and Jochen Runde have maintained the claim that J M Keynes’s contributions to probability and decision theory were of a comparative, qualitative nature only. They maintained that J M Keynes had some interesting, but...

This paper concentrates on Keynes’s solution to a version of Boole’s Challenge Problem of 1851. The problem is solved by Keynes mathematically at the end of Chapter 15 of the A Treatise on Probability, 1921. A study of this problem demonstrates Keynes’s understanding of Boole’s technique...

Paul Davidson has erroneously claimed for 30 years that J M Keynes’s definition and application of his concept of uncertainty in the General Theory is based on the ergodic-non ergodic distinction. It is easy to show that this is false because it would require that J M Keynes was an advocate of...

Smith, Keynes, and Knight, in that order, made seminal contributions to decision making which emphasized uncertainty and indeterminate probabilities, as opposed to mere imprecision. De Finetti’s views on uncertainty are diametrically opposed to those of Smith, Keynes, and Knight once the clear...

Frank P Ramsey’s critique of Keynes’s logical Theory of Probability, presented in 1925 and published in 1930, is so weak and poor that J M Keynes or Bertrand Russell could easily have refuted and decimated Ramsey’s claims in the space of one half of an hour to one hour at Keynes’s...

Keynes recognized that there were a few cases where his rational analysis of decision making under conditions of uncertainty and risk using: (a) interval valued probability in Parts II and III of the A Treatise on Probability,(b) decision weights in Part IV of the A Treatise on Probability ,or...

Nearly one hundred years after Keynes published his A Treatise on Probability in 1921,it appears that practically no philosophers have read Part II of the A Treatise on Probability in either the 20th or 21st centuries. This simply means that no modern day philosopher is in any position to...

J M Keynes's two logical relations of rational degree of probability, α, 0≤α≤1 and Evidential Weight of the Argument, w, 0≤w≤1, where w measures the degree of completeness of the evidence, can't be represented or associated with ordinal probability, although Keynes's theory of...