I present a model in which randomly matched pairs of people bargain over the division of output in each period. Output can be consumed or stored for later consumption. People are identical except possibly in wealth (i.e., the stored output). The one-period utility is linear except for the...

I study the role the agent's wealth plays in the principal-agent matching with moral hazard and limited liability. I consider wealth and talent as the agent's type, and size as the firm's (principal's) type. Because utility is not perfectly transferable in this setup, I use generalized...

How are substitution in the spatial and in the temporal sense connected? Can estimates based on data with spatial variation be transmitted into values appropriate for exploring temporal variation, and vice versa? This paper, building on, inter alia, Frisch (1959), attempts to give some...

This paper complements research on how love of wealth bears on key variables in a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans growth framework. It is shown that for an optimum the social planner cannot have an excessive love of wealth. If the planner has the 'right' love of wealth an optimum exists and implies higher...