Central banks that lack credibility often tie their exchange rate to that of a more credible partner in order to “import” credibility. We show in a small open economy model that a central bank that displays “limited credibility” can deliver significant improvements to a social welfare...

Abandoning an objective function with multiple targets and adopting a single mandate can be an effective way for a central bank to overcome the classic time-inconsistency problem. We show that the choice of a particular single mandate depends on an economy's level of trade openness and the...

This paper conducts general equilibrium (GE) estimation to evaluate the empirical contributions of macroeconomic shocks in explaining the exchange rate disconnect, excess volatility, and the uncovered interest parity (UIP) puzzles. We embed stochastic volatilities and limits-to-international...

Abandoning an objective function with multiple targets and adopting single mandate can be an effective way for a central bank to overcome the classic time-inconsistency problem. We show that the choice of a particular single mandate depends on an economy's level of trade openness and the...