We present and experimentally test a mechanism that provides a simple, natural, low cost, and realistic solution to the problem of compliance with socially determined efficient actions, such as contributing to a public good. We note that small self-governing organizations often place enforcement...

We present and experimentally test a mechanism that provides a simple, natural, low cost, and realistic solution to the problem of compliance with socially determined efficient actions, such as contributing to a public good. We note that small self-governing organizations often place enforcement...

Asymmetric information is a classic example of market failure that undermines the efficiency associated with perfectly competitive market outcomes: the "lemons" market. Credible certification, that substantiates unobservable characteristics of products that consumers value, is often considered a...

This paper investigates the implications of the Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) model on the informational efficiency of financial markets for the optimality of the allocation of talent to financial trading versus entrepreneurship. Informed traders make the financial market more informationally...

Might the resource costliness of making signals credible be low or negligible? Using a job market as an example, we build a signaling model to determine the extent to which a transfer from an applicant might replace a resource cost as an equilibrium method of achieving signal credibility. Should...

The connection between the financial crisis and global imbalances is controversial. This paper argues that this relationship is likely to be connected to the existence of heterogenous financial frictions in different domestic credit markets. By developing a general equilibrium model where...