We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint....

We derive a simple equation for the welfare gains from trade when tariffs are liberalized or iceberg trade costs fall. Covering various one-sector trade models that may or may not feature extensive margins and imperfect competition, we generalize the analysis of Arkolakis, Costinot and...

The robust empirical finding that exporting firms are systematically different from firms that merely serve domestic consumers has inspired the development of a new brand of trade theory, the theory of heterogeneous firms and trade. The establishment of a canonical model due to Melitz (2003) has...

This paper shows that the novel gains from trade liberalization driven by intra-industry reallocations (Melitz (2003)) are not robust to changes in the preference structure. In the Melitz (2003) setting the unambigousness of the welfare effect depends crucially on the assumption of traditional...

The normative analysis of monopolistic competition models of trade suggests that even for a small country a small tariff is welfare improving [Gros (1987) and Helpman and Krugman (1989, ch. 7)]. This note introduces a consumption-leisure trade-off to endogenize labor supply resulting in...

This paper focuses on two issues that challenge the accepted pessimistic view that regional trade agreements (RTAs) between developing countries in welfare terms by taking into account scale economies in transport. First, how is the standard welfare analysis of an RTA affected by the endogeneity...

We derive a simple equation to calculate the global welfare impact of the simultaneous reduction of trade costs between multiple country-pairs. Interestingly, we find that we obtain the same equation for a broad class of trade models. Moreover, balanced trade is mostly not required for the...

I present a model of two quantity-setting firms, each producing two goods in a different country, but enjoying a competitive advantage in only one of them. An international cartel can either shut down trade and manufacture both goods domestically or foreclose the inefficient plant and import the...

We consider an international cartel whose members interact repeatedly in their own as well as in third-country segmented markets. Cartel discipline-an inverse measure of the degree of competition between firms-is endogenously determined by the cartel's incentive compatibility constraint (ICC),...

We consider an international cartel whose members interact repeatedly in their own as well as in third-country segmented markets. Cartel discipline-an inverse measure of the degree of competition between firms-is endogenously determined by the cartel’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICC),...