This paper identifies the migration policies that emerge when both the sending country and the receiving country wield power to set migration quotas, when controlling migration is costly, and when the decision how much human capital to acquire depends, among other things, on the migration...

Consider a population of farmers who live around a lake. Each farmer engages in trade with his two adjacent neighbors. The trade is governed by a prisoner's dilemma "rule of engagement". A farmer's payoff is the sum of the payoffs from the two prisoner's dilemma games played with his two...

Drawing on the literature of occupational status and social distance, a theory is developed of labor migration that is prompted by a desire to avoid "social humiliation". A closed-economy general equilibrium model that incorporates occupational status and examines the interaction between the...

This paper develops a model of voluntary migration into degrading work. The essence of the model is a tension between two "bads" that which arises from being relatively deprived at home, and that which arises from engaging in humiliating work away from home. Balancing between these two "bads"...

A theory is developed of labor migration that is prompted by a desire to avoid "social humiliation". In a general equilibrium framework it is shown that as long as migration can reduce humiliation sufficiently, migration will occur even between two identical economies. Migration increases the...