This paper presents a new argument for international monetary policy coordination based on considerations of structural asymmetries across countries. In a two-country world with a traded and a non-traded sector in each country, optimal independent monetary policy cannot replicate the...

Do countries gain by coordinating their monetary policies if they have different economic structures? We address this issue in the context of a new open-economy macro model with a traded and a non-traded sector and more importantly, with a across-country asymmetry in the size of the traded...

This paper studies monetary regime choice between monetary union and flexible exchange rate regime in a large open economy framework. The classical approach emphasizes that monetary unions are inherently costly because a single interest rate cannot respond effectively to different shocks of...

This paper studies monetary regime choice between monetary union and flexible exchange rate regime in a large open economy framework. The classical approach emphasizes that monetary unions are inherently costly because a single interest rate cannot respond effectively to different shocks of...

This paper studies the welfare impact of a common monetary policy in the context of a two-country, general equilibrium model with liquidity effect and nominal wage contracts, heterogeneous agents, imperfect competition in the labor market, trade in goods, immobility of labor and mobility of...

This paper analyses the implications of cost-push shocks for the optimal choice of monetary policy target in an two-country sticky-price model. In addition to cost-push shocks, each country is subject to labour-supply and money-demand shocks. It is shown that the fully optimal coordinated policy...

In the literature on international monetary policy, the paradigm is that gains from coordination are fairly small. Monetary policy is conducted to stabilize macroeconomic fluctuations and gains from policy coordination arise from preventing national monetary authorities from strategically...

In this paper, I argue that international policy coordination requires to include both monetary as well as fiscal policy because both sides include policy instruments that allow the strategic manipulation of the country's terms of trade. Hence, the coordination of one part of national...

This paper analyses the implications of real wage rigidities in a stochastic two-country general equilibrium model. It is shown how real wage rigidities in one country affect welfare in both countries. Assuming that the choice of whether or not to adopt flexible wages is in the hands of labour...

I explore international monetary policy coordination and its welfare effects under a two-country macroeconomic model with the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates in a floating exchange rate regime. Under the model, I find that monetary policy coordination does not improve total...