Existing experimental research on behavior in weakest-link games shows overwhelmingly the inability of people to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium, especially in larger groups. We hypothesize that people are able to coordinate on efficient outcomes, provided they have sufficient freedom to...

Existing experimental research on behavior in weakest-link games shows overwhelmingly the inability of people to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium, especially in larger groups. We hypothesize that people will be able to coordinate on efficient outcomes, provided they have sufficient...

In a wide variety of social settings (e.g. crime, education, political activism, technology adoption), players' returns to their efforts depend on how much effort others exert. Modeling these situations as a network game with strategic complementarities, we show that a player's cycle centrality...

We study a structural model of R&D alliance networks in which firms jointly form R&D collaborations to lower their production costs while competing on the product market. We derive the Nash equilibrium of this game, provide a welfare analysis and determine the optimal R&D subsidy program that...

We study a structural model of R&D alliance networks in which firms jointly form R&D collaborations to lower their production costs while competing on the product market. We derive the Nash equilibrium of this game, provide a welfare analysis and determine the optimal R&D subsidy program that...

This paper proposes a model for a certification market with an imperfect testing technology. Such a technology only assures that whenever two products are tested the higher quality product is more likely to pass than the lower quality one. When only one certifier with such testing technology is...

In this paper we consider a model with two industrialised countries and immigrants that come from the rest of the world . The countries are distinguished on the basis of three parameters: population size, bias towards immigrants, and production complementarity between native population and...

In this paper we consider a model with two industrialised countries and immigrants that come from the rest of the world. The countries are distinguished on the basis of three parameters: population size, bias towards immigrants, and production complementarity between native population and...