We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolistic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that...

Recently there has been a notable increase in interest in antitrust law in much of the world. This chapter discusses antitrust policy toward horizontal mergers, the area of antitrust that has seen some of the most dramatic improvements in both economic tools and the application of economics in...

The question of how interventions from the Competition Authority (CA) affect investment is not a straightforward one: a tougher competition policy might, by reducing the ability to exert market power, either stimulate firms to invest more to counter the restrictions on their actions, or make...

We analyze the gross welfare gains from real-time retail pricing in electricity markets where carbon taxation induces investment in variable renewable technologies. Applying a stylized numerical electricity market model, we find a U-shaped association between carbon taxation and gross welfare...

This paper introduces the Werden-Froeb Index (WFI) to assist in evaluating merger-specific efficiencies in horizontal mergers. The index measures the weighted average reduction in marginal costs required to restore pre-merger equilibrium prices and quantities after the (full or partial) merger...

This paper introduces a model of limited consumer attention into an otherwise standard new trade theory model with love-of-variety preferences and heterogeneous firms. In this setting, we show that trade liberalization needs not be welfare enhancing if the consumers' capacity to gather and...

This paper assesses the impact of adopting a post-grant review institution in the US patent system by comparing the 'opposition careers' of European Patent Office (EPO) equivalents of litigated US patents to those of a control group of EPO patents. We demonstrate several novel methods of...

Partly motivated by the recent antitrust investigations concerning Google, we develop a leverage theory of tying in two-sided markets. We analyze incentives for a monopolist to tie its monopolized product with another product in a two-sided market. Tying provides a mechanism to circumvent the...

We consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network externalities. A platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes "focal" in the current period, in that agents play the equilibrium in which they adopt the focal platform whenever such equilibrium exists....

This paper studies optimal sport league size. League expansion lowers average player quality, reducing fans utility in inframarginal locations, while fan utility in new locations rises. Welfare analyses of such expansions must compare these two effects. Using a model where fan demand depends on...