We investigate the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a two-sided platform that enables interaction between buyers and sellers. Sellers are heterogenous with respect to their per-interaction benefit, and, under price discrimination, the platform can condition its fee on...

Policies to correct market power and selection can be misguided when these forces co-exist. We build a model of symmetric imperfect competition in selection markets that parameterizes the degree of market power and selection. We use graphical price-theoretic reasoning to characterize the...

This paper studies monopolistic third-degree price discrimination incorporating consumers' fairness concerns: Discriminatory pricing antagonizes consumers and may reduce their demand. In contrast to previous studies, we show that consumers' concerns about price inequity may deter discriminatory...

Using a game theoretic framework, we show that not only can pay-what-you-want pricing generate positive profits, but it can also be more profitable than charging a fixed price to all consumers. Further, whenever it is more profitable, it is also Pareto-improving. We derive conditions in terms of...

In digital markets, big technology firms like Google, Microsoft, Amazon, etc., compete with each other across multiple markets. Some markets are platforms/two-sided with products offered for free to users, whereas other markets are one-sided with paid products. In some cases, market competition...

We investigate the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a two-sided platform that enables interaction between buyers and sellers. Sellers are heterogenous with respect to their per-interaction benefit, and, under price discrimination, the platform can condition its fee on...

We consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network externalities. A platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes "focal" in the current period, in that agents play the equilibrium in which they adopt the focal platform whenever such equilibrium exists....