We provide a framework to decompose preferences into a notion of distributive justice and a selfishness part and to recover individual notions of distributive justice from data collected in appropriately designed experiments. “Dictator games” with varying transfer rates used in Andreoni and...

We provide a framework to decompose preferences into a notion of distributive justice and a selfishness part and to recover individual notions of distributive justice from data collected in appropriately designed experiments. "Dictator games" with varying transfer rates used in Andreoni and...

We propose an instrument to measure individuals' social preferences regarding equity and efficiency behind a veil of ignorance. We pair portfolio and wealth distribution choice problems which have a common budget set. For a given bundle, the distribution over an individual's wealth is the same...

We consider the problem of fairly reallocating the individual endowments of a perfectly divisible good among agents with single-peaked preferences. We provide a new concept of fairness, called position-wise envy-freeness, that is compatible with individual rationality. This new concept requires...

Among the reasons behind the choice behavior of an individual taking a stochastic form are her potential indifference or indecisiveness between certain alternatives, and/or her willingness to experiment in the sense of occasionally deviating from choosing a best alternative in order to give a...

We propose a method to recover homothetic preferences from choice data with minor optimization or measurement errors. Our method allows for a more detailed graphical analysis to reveal subjects' preferences and to choose appropriate functional forms for parametric analysis. It can also be used...

We propose a method to recover homothetic preferences from choice data with minor optimization or measurement errors. Our method allows for a more detailed graphical analysis to reveal subjects' preferences and to choose appropriate functional forms for parametric analysis. It can also be used...

This paper develops an expanded framework for social planning in which coercion stemming from the provision of public goods is explicitly acknowledged. Key issues concern the precise definition of coercion, its difference from redistribution, and its incorporation into social welfare...