This volume on experimental economics offers both new research grounds and a bird's eye view on the field. In the first part, leading experimental economists, among them Vernon S. Smith and Daniel Friedman, give inspiring insights into their view on the general development of this field. In the...

Contract enforcement does not only affect single transactions but the market as a whole. We compare alternative institutions that allocate enforcement rights to the different parties to a credit transaction: either lenders, borrowers, or judges. Despite all parties having incentives to enforce...

By combining two large data sets (on international trade flows and cross-border mergers and acquisitions - M&As), we test two implications of Neary’s (2003, 2007) general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) model (incorporating strategic interaction between firms in a general equilibrium...

We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint....

Despite a variety of measures taken by high tax countries, the international fight against tax havens so far remained rather ineffective. This paper introduces lobbying as a possible explanation for this observation. I analyze the international fight against tax havens in a two country model in...

By combining two large data sets (on international trade flows and on mergers and acquisitions - M&As), we are able to test two implications of Neary's (2003, 2004a) recent theoretical work. Analyzing M&As in a General Oligopolistic Equilibrium (GOLE) model incorporating strategic interaction...