We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint....

We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint....

Tax harmonization entails a uniform rate that may not suit all governments. Harmonization can advance collective governmental objectives only if the standard deviation of tax rates is less than the average downward effect of tax competition on rates. Since an efficient harmonized tax rate undoes...

I propose a model of income redistribution in an open-economy environment. The world consists of a finite number of countries whose governments seek to maximize the welfare of their low-skilled populations by taxing skilled workers' labor income. While tax competition limits the extent to which...

In the context of international tax coordination incomplete information is one of the well-known frictions that can lead to bargaining failure and might explain a lack of observed coordination. We consider international negotiations about tax coordination under complete and incomplete...

The sharing between national tax authorities of taxpayer-specific information has emerged over the last few years as a - probably 'the' - central issue in the formation of international tax policy. Yet this refocusing of the debate on international taxation - away from parametric tax...

Most governments have laws to prevent cartels and ensure competition, but most governments do not apply the logic of competition policy to their own activities. This book sets out the benefits that follow when governments promote tax competition. The book begins with a primer on international...

This paper studies the role of transfers among groups within a country as well as among countries in a two level game of international trade negotiations. We show that in order to realize the intended transfer in the presence of asymmetric information on the states of recipients (and donors), a...