In this Chapter, we briefly survey the common law's adventures with creditor protection over the course of American history with a special focus on Delaware, the most important jurisdiction for corporate law. We examine the evolution of the equitable doctrines that judges have used to answer a...

The leximetric research on shareholder protection can contribute to core questions of comparative company law. For example, such research may be able to show whether or not there is a trend to increase shareholder power across countries. It can also provide us with tools to confirm or challenge...

After the financial crisis, there has been considerable debate about the role of corporations in society. It has become broadly accepted that corporations - particularly the world's largest publicly traded corporations – need to be governed with respect for the society and the environment....

Climate change is a quintessential market failure. Individual companies do not have economic incentives to reduce their carbon emissions and therefore produce more emissions than is socially desirable. However, according to a theory that is gaining increasing support among academics and market...

This paper discusses why a “corporate governance movement” that commenced in the United States in the 1970s became an entrenched feature of American capitalism and describes how the chronology differed in a potentially crucial way for banks. The paper explains corporate governance's...

Corwin v. KKR, one of many recent cases aiming to mitigate the “deal tax” in M&A represented by baseless litigation, is considered one of the most important corporate law decisions of the 2000s. Corwin shields directors from the enhanced scrutiny of Revlon in favor of the business judgment...

An important issue in evaluating corporate governance is how to measure it. In prior work on emerging markets, we have advocated measuring firm-level governance using country-specific indices, tailored to each country's laws and institutions. An alternate approach, used in commercial indices, is...

Does the structure of corporate boards affect bondholder agency risk? Using mandatory board reforms, I show that firms that transition to independent boards experience economically significant reductions in payout, financing, and event risk covenants in their bond contracts. This effect is not...

This paper critically examines the conventional view that the lack of fiduciary duty protections for corporate shareholders in civil law systems explains crucial differences in corporate structure and finance. It questions the thesis that the structure of civil law systems militates against the...