Showing 1 - 10 of 2,161
Deltas, Salvo and Vasconcelos (2011) develop a model of geographically separated markets with differentiated goods in which collusion (or merger to monopoly), by restricting trade relative to duopolistic competition, is beneficial for society and can be beneficial for consumers. In this chapter,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013098827
We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012926563
This paper studies the impact of market power on international commodity prices. I use a standard oligopoly model and exploit historical variations in the structure of the international coffee bean market to assess the impact of a cartel treaty on coffee prices and its global welfare...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013039191
A fast-growing legal literature commenting on a set of empirical papers alleging anticompetitive effects of common ownership claims that the reported effects, if true, would imply that corporate executives violate their fiduciary duty: whereas acting in the interest of common owners can help...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012911211
That collusion among sellers hurts buyers is a central tenet in economics. We provide an oligopoly model in which collusion can raise consumer surplus. A differentiated-product duopoly operates in two geographically-separated markets. Each market is home to a single firm, but can import, at a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938655
In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical markets and face antitrust enforcement in different jurisdictions. We are concerned with the effectiveness of leniency programs and the benefits of international antitrust...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013144908
We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011781965
We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 5) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014159864
The Austrian Federal Competition Authority (AFCA) invited comment on its draft guidelines for exempting “sustainability agreements” from condemnation under Austrian competition law. That law recently changed, allowing a specific exemption for otherwise anticompetitive horizontal agreements...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014081835
I study the simultaneous ownership of equity of competing companies by the same investor, i.e., common ownership, in 39,867 publicly listed corporations in 125 countries between 2000-2020. I construct a global data set to document the prevalence of common ownership in multiple forms, including...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014351160