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substantial externality on the rest of the world. We analyze whether the threat of counter-geoengineering technologies capable of … international cooperation. Our game-theoretical model of asymmetric countries allows for a rigorous analysis of the strategic …
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. This raises the important issue of just how such voluntary cooperation might be obtained. In this paper, we explore the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012718767
knowledge to trigger appropriate action, but diverging national interests remain the key impediment to cooperation and …. When some countries fail to cooperate, the international community can still forge cooperation,including by realigning … incentives and demonstrating benefit from incremental steps toward full cooperation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013043705
knowledge to trigger appropriate action, but diverging national interests remain the key impediment to cooperation and …. When some countries fail to cooperate, the international community can still forge cooperation, including by realigning … incentives and demonstrating benefit from incremental steps toward full cooperation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013044864
This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international … cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is assumed that when countries cooperate they coordinate their investments so as to … spillover effects of their investments in R&D. In order to analyze the scope of cooperation, an agreement formation game is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344228
Almost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such a rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyze a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010330092
international agreements as variations of the public-goods game, and examine the incentives for cooperation under each alternative … familiar from both the Kyoto and Copenhagen climate summits. Since cap-and-trade rules decrease cooperation by developing … targets. To break this deadlock and shift the equilibrium toward cooperation, a modification of the public-goods game based on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014044933
The Kyoto summit initiated an international game of cap and trade. Unlike a national policy, the essence of this game is the self-selection of national emission targets. This differs from the standard global public-goods game because targets are met in the context of a global carbon market. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014191875