This paper studies, both theoretically and empirically, how subordinates to CEOs can discipline the CEOs' self-serving activities. I predict that, because CEOs' self-serving activities hurt the subordinates through the subordinates' stakes in the firms, the subordinates who observe these...

This paper examines the reliance on ESG metrics in executive compensation contracts. In our sample of international publicly traded firms, a rapidly growing fraction incorporate ESG metrics in the compensation schemes of their top executives. Our analysis links the reliance on these metrics to...

We address the question of how the internal organization of partnerships can be affected by moral hazard behavior of their division(s)/agent(s). We explore cases where two entregreneurs, each employing one agent subject ot moral hazard, decide how to conduct a research project together. The...

We examine the impact of informal cultural attributes, such as generalized trust and civic cooperation in a society, on the presence of Big N auditors and audit fees in country-specific audit markets. On one hand, because societies with higher trust and civic cooperation are associated with low...