Bank capital regulation seems to be today's most accepted regulatory instrument. The reasoning is that limited liability and deposit insurance appear to give banks incentives for excessive risk-taking. Capital requirements can alleviate this problem as banks are obliged to hold more capital...

Recent econometric evidence has noticeably changed views on the desirability and the appropriate design of explicit Deposit Insurance Schemes (DIS). The purpose of this paper is to take a second look at the data. After surveying recent empirical work and providing a theoretical framework, we...

During the global financial crisis (GFC), regulators and policymakers turned to deposit insurers, along with monetary and fiscal measures, to help restore market confidence and promote financial stability. These events have focused attention on the role of deposit insurers and their role in the...

Since the Great Financial Crisis, emerging market economies (EMEs) have made much progress on enhancing their frameworks to manage banking crises. Yet significant challenges remain. Banking sectors and bank ownership are more concentrated in EMEs than in advanced ecomonies (AEs), and banks fund...

We use the German Crisis of 1931, a key event of the Great Depression, to study how depositors behave during a bank run in the absence of deposit insurance. We find that deposits decline by around 20 percent during the run and that there is an equal outflow of retail and nonfinancial wholesale...

This paper examines the impact of financial market development, financial crises and deposit insurance on bank risk based on macro data of 86 countries during the period 1998-2014. The results show that banking sector development and stock market development have opposing effects on bank risk...