This paper provides evidence on how the new international regulation on Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) impacts the market value of large banks. We analyze the stock price reactions for the 300 largest banks from 52 countries across 12 relevant regulatory announcement and...

In this paper we propose a measure of systemic risk in the financial sector, the Expected Systemic Shortfall (ESS) indicator. The ESS-indicator is the product of the probability of a systemic default event and the expected tail loss in case this systemic event occurs. We compute the...

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) framework used to identify global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) is based on banks’ balance sheet information, leaving information derived from market data untapped. Among the most widely used market-based systemic risk measures, Adrian...

We examine sources of systemic risk (threshold size, complexity, and interconnectedness) with factors constructed from equity returns of large financial firms, after accounting for standard risk factors. From the factor loadings and factor returns, we estimate the implicit government subsidy for...

We develop a mean field model of interbanking borrowing and lending activities. Each bank borrows from or lends to other counterparties at an idiosyncratic rate, and is exposed to sudden shocks affecting the level of its monetary reserves. Using weak convergence analysis, we provide an explicit...

We characterize how U.S. global systemically important banks (GSIBs) supply short-term dollar liquidity in repo and foreign exchange swap markets in the post-Global Financial Crisis regulatory environment and serve as the "lenders-of-second-to-last-resort". Using daily supervisory bank balance...

In mid-September 2008, following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, international interbank markets froze and interbank lending beyond very short maturities virtually evaporated. Despite massive central bank support operations and purchases of key assets, many financial markets remained impaired...

We develop a theoretical model examining the financial stability policy of a central bank serving as both the lender of last resort and the regulator of the financial system. The model accommodates the possibility of financial contagion through interbank market linkages, and adverse feedback...

We examine the assertion that ratings from the ratings agencies that explicitly assume governmental support for Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) translate into lower spreads and a funding cost advantage for those G-SIBs. We analyze whether the market over the past 14 years in fact...