Justice has great latitude in recommending corporate cartel fines to the federal courts, and its recommendations are nearly … direct test of the optimal deterrence theory of antitrust crimes. Regressions are fitted to a sample of the corporations that …-deterrence model is quite good. We find that U.S. corporate cartel fines are strongly directly related to economic injuries from …

the predictive power of the optimal deterrence theory of antitrust violations in the EU. In addition, they offer insights … absolute Commission fine. Independent variables fall into four groups: the extent of the cartel’s antitrust injuries; factors … cartel; and controls for time, for changes in EC guidelines, for nationality of the defendant, and for industry …

The amino-acid lysine cartel was a watershed even in antitrust enforcement. It was the first global price … history of the global lysine cartel and the legal consequences for its members in the United States. The story focuses …

This paper presents an updated narrative of the history of the global lysine cartel and the legal consequences for its …

. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are … strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint. Importantly, trade costs affect cartel shipments and welfare not … costs exert a negative and significant effect on cartel discipline. In turn, cartel discipline has a negative and …

. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are … strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint. Importantly, trade costs affect cartel shipments and welfare not … costs exert a negative and significant effect on cartel discipline. In turn, cartel discipline has a negative and …

authorities after January 1990. The median cartel had five corporate members and generated $1.2 billion in sales during the … penalties, if imposed at maximum levels, would extract about 12 times cartel overcharges, a level sufficient to deter most firms … from forming or joining a cartel. However, applying optimal deterrence concepts to the characteristics of modern …

Standard methods for calculating cartel-damages rely on data of prices charged and quantity sold. Such data may not … easily be available. In this paper, it is shown that a lower bound for cartel-damages can also be computed from accounting … is shown under which econometrically testable assumptions on accounting costs a meaningful lower bound for cartel damages …

. We show that a social planner would further restrict trade than the perfect cartel would, and how the socially optimal …