When and how can weak states increase their bargaining leverage in international organizations? I argue that during phases of routine bargaining, distributional outcomes depend on the states' political and economic leverage and less on the formal allocation rules, so they are unfavorable to weak...

We analyze institutional solutions to international cooperation when collective action creates negative externalities and splits the actors into supporters and opponents, all of whom can spend resources toward their preferred outcome. We study how actors can communicate their preferences through...

Terrorism is an instrument for groups that cannot achieve their political goals legally. One important strategic function of terrorism is to weaken the government - either directly by attacking representatives or supporters of the government or indirectly by causing a political response, which...

An emerging "clash of civilizations" should reveal itself in patterns of international terror¬ism. Huntington himself explicitly refers to terrorism in the conflict between specific civilizations, and particularly so in the clash between the Islamic civilization and the West. We confront his...

Objectives. We examined the effects of market income inequality (income inequality before taxes and transfers) and income redistribution via taxes and transfers on inequality in longevity. Methods. We used life tables to compute Gini coefficients of longevity inequality for all individuals and...

Most combatants in armed conflict are men, so naturally men are the major direct victims of military operations. Yet, armed conflicts have important indirect negative consequences on agriculture, infrastructure, public health provision and social order. These indirect consequences are often...