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Distributional preferences and competitive behavior

Balafoutas, Loukas; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009229880

Distributional preferences and competitive behavior

Balafoutas, Loukas; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2011

We study experimentally the relationship between distributional preferences and competitive behavior. We find that spiteful subjects react strongest to competitive pressure and win in a tournament significantly more often than efficiency-minded and inequality averse subjects. However, when given...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009737068

New perspectives on industrial organization : with contributions from behavioral economics and game theory

Tremblay, Victor J.; Tremblay, Carol Horton - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009623222

New Perspectives on Industrial Organization : With Contributions from Behavioral Economics and Game Theory

Tremblay, Victor J. - 2012

Chapter 1 Introduction -- Chapter 2 Demand, Technology, and the Theory of the Firm -- Chapter 3 Introductory Game … Theory and Economic Information -- Chapter 4 Behavioral Economics -- Chapter 5 Perfect Competition and Market Imperfections ….This text puts more emphasis on the micro-foundations (i.e., consumer and producer theory),classic game theoretic models, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014016020

Evolutionarily stable preferences in contests

Leininger, Wolfgang (contributor) - 2008

We define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock)contests. While it is known (Leininger, 2003) that the direct evolutionary approach in the form of finite population ESS (Schaffer, 1988) yields more aggressive behavior than in Nash equilibrium, it is now shown that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003728964

Evolutionarily stable preferences in contests

Leininger, Wolfgang (contributor) - 2008

We define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock) contests. While it is known (Leininger, 2003) that the direct evolutionary approach in the form of finite population ESS (Schaffer, 1988) yields more aggressive behavior than in Nash equilibrium, it is now shown that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003730276