Standard economics provides a well-understood framework of the competitive determinants of market prices that is now widely accepted for antitrust analysis. In “two-sidedmarkets,” where firms supply products demanded by two interrelated groups of consumers, these competitive forces operate...

Manufacturer competition for retail distribution is shown to often include partially exclusive contracts when competitive retailers have the ability to shift sales by loyal customers to a chosen manufacturer. Since each manufacturer knows its sales will increase substantially at the expense of...

The collection of user data by providers of online services recently has become a popular topic in debates about the application of competition policy to online markets. At issue is whether the collection of large amounts of data — sometimes referred to as “big data” — in particular data...

The antitrust law of bundled discounts is unsettled. LePage's broadly condemned bundled discounts instituted by a dominant firm where it appeared that the discounts served no economic purpose other than to place rival, single product suppliers at a competitive disadvantage. In contrast,...

Slotting fees, per-unit-time payments made by manufacturers to retailers for shelf space, have become increasingly prevalent in grocery retailing. Shelf space contracts are shown to be a consequence of the normal competitive process when retailer shelf space is promotional, in the sense that the...

Slotting fees, per unit time payments made by manufacturers to retailers for shelf space, have become increasingly prevalent in grocery retailing. Shelf space contracts are shown to be a consequence of the normal competitive process when retailer shelf space is promotional, in the sense that the...