We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our framework covers models of income taxation, public-goods provision or publicly provided private goods. Politicians are vote-share-maximizers. They can propose any policy that is...

Die Steuer- und Abgabensysteme in der Europäischen Union sind durch eine heterogene Struktur gekennzeichnet. Harmonisierungsbestrebungen im Bereich der direkten Steuern und zunehmender Steuerwettbewerb bei gleichzeitigem Globalisierungsprozeß der Unternehmen führen zu Anpassungen der...

We propose a methodology for estimating the competition effects from entry when firms sell differentiated products. We first derive precise conditions under which Bresnahan and Reiss'entry threshold ratios (ETRs) can be used to test for the presence and to measure the magnitude of competition...