We examine the effect of a hospital's objective (i.e., non-profit versus for-profit) in hospital markets for elective care. Using game-theoretic analysis and queueing models to capture the operational performance of hospitals, we compare the equilibrium behavior of three market settings in terms...

We model competition between two firms selling identical goods to customers who arrive in the market stochastically. Shoppers choose where to purchase based upon both price and the time cost associated with waiting for service. One seller provides two separate queues, each with its own server,...

This paper describes a duopoly market for healthcare where one of the two providers is publicly owned and charges a price of zero, while the other sets a price so as to maximize its profit. Both providers are subject to congestion in the form of an M/M/1 queue, and they serve patient-consumers...

We consider the joint operation of two multi-server queueing systems. Both systems provide the same type of service and compete for customers. It is assumed that the first system is controlled by ourselves while the second one is controlled by our competitor. The arriving customers are shared...

The EU agenda for improving competitiveness is missing in action. Economic competitiveness has been a central plank in the development of the European Union - a relentless quest for policies that lead to more prosperity and that make European companies in world markets more successful. However,...

We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, banks' reserve holdings and aggregate liquidity. Banks compete in a differentiated loan market, hold reserves against liquidity shocks, and refinance in the interbank market. A merger creates an internal money market that induces financial...