In this paper we utilize discrete choice experiment method to identify and measure switching costs and network effects in mobile telephony in Poland. Based on hypothetical choices consumers make we construct a conditional random parameters multinomial logit model to analyze their preferences. In...

A general theoretical and empirical framework is developed for assessing the potential of a vertically integrated firm to foreclose downstream competitors. Using this framework a policymaker may also evaluate the empirical welfare effects from a vertically integrated firm raising rivals' costs....

This paper studies the effect of competition and consumer myopia on platform profits. The focus is on airports, which provide passengers with aeronautical and commercial services through airlines and retailers. Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we unravel the relationship between...

We consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network externalities. A platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes “focal” in the current period, in that agents play the equilibrium in which they adopt the focal platform whenever such equilibrium...

We consider platform competition in the presence of small users and a user-group. One platform enjoys a quality advantage and the other benefits from favorable beliefs. We study whether the group mitigates the users' coordination problem -- i.e., joining a low-quality platform because they...

We consider platform competition in the presence of small users and a usergroup. One platform enjoys a quality advantage and the other benefits from favorable beliefs. We study whether the group mitigates the users' coordination problem i.e., joining a low-quality platform because they believe...

We study platforms competing in commissions on revenues of sellers engaged in monopolistic competition, as the app providers on the app stores of iPhones and Android devices. Free entry of sellers on each platform generates multihoming superstars and a long tail of singlehoming sellers....

We consider a dynamic platform competition in a market with network externalities. The incumbent platform enjoys a focal position such that consumers expect other consumers to join it, while the entrant platform may enjoy a quality advantage. We examine the effect of an antitrust policy that...

The mobile app economy comprises two distinct platform markets through which app developers make revenue: app platform and ad platform markets. App sales are facilitated by app platforms, whereas advertising matching is intermediated by ad platforms. Cross-market platform competition exists,...

This paper analyzes the effects of tying arrangements on market competition and social welfare in two-sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi-homing; that is, they can participate in multiple platforms in order to reap maximal network benefits. The model shows that tying induces...