We develop a model of contests on networks. Each player is “connected” to a set of contests and exerts a single effort to increase the probability of winning each contest to which she is connected. We characterize equilibria under the Tullock contest success function and explore how behavior...

We study competitive behavior in all-pay Tullock (1980) contests with identity-dependent externalities (IDEs) governed by a fixed network. First, we introduce a model of network contest games, in which the prize generates an externality---which may be positive or negative---that impacts each...

Suppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are connected to. Firms compete a la Cournot and decide how much to supply to each market they have a link with. We assume that markets have linear demand functions and firms have...

In this article, we analyze the dynamic competition between two platform firms (A&B) in two-sided markets with network externalities. In Period 1, platform A or B wins the contest in a first stage and can serve the two-sided market monopolistically in a second stage. In Period 2, the two...

Suppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are connected to. Firms compete a la Cournot and decide how much to supply to each market they have a link with. We assume that markets have linear demand functions and firms have...

This paper experimentally investigates the interdependence between market competition and endogenously emerging inter-firm collaboration. We restrict attention to arrangements resulting from bilateral collaboration agreements that typically characterize real world applications in which the...

We analyze the endogenous formation of R&D networks, where firms are active in different product markets and can benefit from R&D spillovers form collaborating firms within or across different industries. R&D spillovers help firms to introduce process innovations to lower their production costs....

This paper proposes a model of voting competitions (political campaigns and strategic lobbying) where voters are influenced by the opinion of their neighbors on a social network. In the unique pure strategy nash equilibrium, resources are targeted toward individuals with an influential position...

Current merger review law is critically flawed. Courts in Clayton Act Section 7 cases consider the likelihood that a merger will harm competition as a threshold question before considering the size of harm that could ensue. Under current law, to block a merger a judge must find that the deal is...

Policy makers are increasingly concerned about the combination of market power and massive data collection in digital markets. This concern is fueled by the theoretical prediction that more market power causes firms to collect ever more data from their users. We investigate the relationship...