Order display is associated with benefits and costs. Benefits arise from increased execution-priority, while costs are due to adverse market impact. We analyze a structural model of optimal order placement that captures trade-off between costs and benefits of order display. For a benchmark model...

We study the effects of disruption risk in a supply chain where one retailer deals with competing risky suppliers who may default during their production lead-times. The suppliers, who compete for business with the retailer by establishing wholesale prices, are leaders in a Stackelberg game with...

Concerned with the risk of supplier default, a firm may choose to diversify its orders among multiple suppliers. Furthermore, the discrepancy in production lead-times among suppliers furnishes a firm with a valuable option to defer ordering decisions until uncertainty has been partially...

We propose a simple bargaining procedure, the equilibrium of which converges to the Walrasian allocation as the agents become increasingly patient. We thus establish that the competitive outcome obtains even if agents have market power and are not price-takers. Moreover, where in other...

We argue that the complex interactions of competitive heterogeneous firms lead to a statistical equilibrium distribution of firms' profit rates, which turns out to be an exponential power (or Subbotin) distribution. Moreover, we construct a diffusion process that has the Subbotin distribution as...